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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNELL H. WELCHMAN and EVA 
B. WELCHMAN, 
Plaintiffs and App,ellants, 
vs. 
MERRILL J. WOOD, djbja Wood 
Realty Company, and MILO D. 
CARTER, 
D,efendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATE~MENT 
Case No. 
8718 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismis-
sing plaintiffs' action for damages for breach of contract 
or, in the alternative, for restitution of a comm1ssion paid 
to defendants by plaintiffs. 
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It was felt appropriate, in connection with the review 
of a summary judgme·nt, to bring up the entire record. 
T·hroughout this brief, R indicates pages ·of the record, 
and D ~pages of the deposition published herein (R. 18). 
Italicized emphasis throughout this brief :has be,en added 
by appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs had a pressing need for money, in order 
to pay debts. They decided to sell their house to raise 
it (D. 34, 35). Accordingly, they entered into a written 
listing agreement with defendant \Vood on March 8, 
1956 (D. 4; R. 31). This listing agreement did notre-
quire ,a trade of properties. It provided, in handwriting, 
"Will exchange for money,·~ and in the fine print on the 
reverse side was the provision, ". . . If I agree to an 
exchange of said property, . . . '' ( R. 31). 
Wood assigned his salesman, defendant Carter, to 
seek a buyer (R. 9 ~ D. 15). Defendants did not present 
plaintiffs 'vith any offer until April 28, 1956. On that 
day Carter came to plaintiffs with an offer from a couple 
by tlie nrune of Granger to exchange their residence 
valued at $10,000 for plaintiffs residence valued at $21,-
000, with the balance, after adjusting equities~ to be paid 
to plaintiffs by Granger's in n1onthly installments, under 
a real estate contract (D. 14, 9). 
Plaintiffs were a:t first unwilling to accept Granger's 
offer because it 'vould not produce the cash that they 
sorely needed (R. 1: D. 14, 27, 32). Carter assured them 
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that they \vould obtain sufficient oash from the trans-
action because defendant~s could make available to them 
$8,600 under an F.H.A. loan on the Granger house, which 
·would result in almost $3,500 net cash for plaintiffs, 
and defendants could sell their proposed real estate con-
tract with Granger's for at le~ast $4,000 cash (R. 1; D. 14, 
15, 16, 26, 27, 35, 36). Plaintiffs express-ed concern that 
defendants might not be able to make available these 
sums, but Carter assured them that there was nothing 
to worry about. He discussed the matter with Wood over 
the phone and p:romised them that these amounts would 
be forthcoming (R. 1; D. 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 36, 37). 
Solely in reliance upon Carter's representations 
and promises, and in consideration thereof, plaintiffs 
agreed with defendants to make the trade with Granger's 
(R. 1; D. 9, 14, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39). D,efendants thereby 
became entitled to receive a commission of $1,050 from 
plaintif:Ds ;plus an additional commission of almost $500 
from Granger's, none of which they would have been 
entitled to otherwise unless they had produced a buyer 
\Vho would "·exchange for rnoney" (R. 1, 31; D. 10, 11, 
37). Plaintiffs acting in reliance upon this oral modifi-
cation completed the transaction with Granger's and 
subsequently paid the commission to defendants, so thrat 
plaintiffs fully performed everything that they agreed 
to perform under the new agreement (R. 2; D. 10, 11, 
12, 32, 37, 39, 42, 43). By completing the trade with the 
third party, Granger's, plaintiffs materially and irre-
vocably changed their position. 
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Defendants failed to make available to plaintiffs 
any F.H.A. financing, because ·of a substantial defect 
in the roundation of the house (Granger's) to be financed, 
and failed to sell the Granger contract for $4,000, be-
caus~e no one would buy it at that price (R. 2; D. 30, 17, 
19, 37)~ Plaintiffs subsequently suffered direct and 
proximate dam·ages as a result (R. 2, 3; D. 20-24, 31, 
38, 39). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The pleadings, deposition, exhibit and affidavit on 
file show . that there are genuine issues as to material 
facts and that defendants are not entitled to jud~ent, 
dismis~sing the action, as a matter of l·aw. 
ARGUMENT 
The principal question involved in this case comes 
down to this: Can defendants induce plaintiffs to follow 
a particular course of action, expressly assume the risk 
of an unsatisfactory result, reap a \vindfall thereby, and 
then, when what they have promised fails to result and 
plaintiffs are left without the agreed recompense, hide 
behind the ·claim that the transaction imposes no enforce-
able obligations upon them? 
The district court entered sununary judgment, on 
motion of defendants, on defendants~ theory· that plain-
tiffs are not e11titled to damages for th·e breach of an 
alleged oral contract, Pither because no such contract 
had be,en made or because, in any eyent it is barred by 
the statute of frauds. 
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A motion for sunrmary judgment pierces the plead-
ings; ~he formal issues presented by the pleadings are 
not controlling .and the court must consider the entire 
setting of the case and all pap·ers of record. Barron and 
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, (Rules Edi-
tion), 3:89, §1236, (·citing numerous authorities). Sum-
mary judgment is a drastic remedy which the courts are, 
and should be, reluctant to usie. Holland vs. Columbia 
Iron Mining ·Comparny, 4 Utah 2d 303; 293 P2d 700, 705 
(.concurring opinion); Travelers Indemnity vs. Mcintosh, 
112 Cal App 2d 177, 245 P2d 1065 1068. In reviewing a 
summary judgment, the party against whom it was 
granted is entitled to have the court consider the evi-
dence and every fair inference fairly arising therefrom 
in the light most favorable to him. Morris ·vs. Farns-
worth Motel, ____ Utah ____ ; 259 P2d 297, 298; Holland vs. 
Columbia I·ron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303; 293 P2d 700, 
703 (concurring opinion); Strauss VB. Strauss, 90 Cal 
App 2d 757, 203 P2d 857, 858. 
A. A NEW, ORALLY MODIFIED, CONTRACT WAS 
ENTERED INTO SUBSEQUENT TO THE WRITTEN ONE ... 
Was a new contract entered into by the parties on 
April 28, 1956, which modified and, to the extent of :such 
modification, replaced ifue original written ·contract of 
March 8, 1956 ~ 
The factual situation is presented supra. It should 
be stressed that under the fonner written listing agre·e-
ment, plaintiffs had no obligation, whatsoever, to con-
tract for an exchange of p~roperties with any buyer pro-
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duced by defendants. That agreement provided on its 
face, ''Will exchange for money'' (R. 31), the. word 
"money" having been handwritten. The fin:e ~print on 
the reverse of said listing card specified " ... If I agree 
to an exchange ·of s:aid property . . . '' Even if the 
written and printed provisions can be considered to be 
inconsistent, it is well established that, in such case, the 
handwriting must prev·ail. 12 Am. Jur. 797, §253. The 
verbal modification of April 28th has all the essential 
elements of contract, as is fully evident in the deposition 
of plaintiff Arn;ell H. Welchman (D. 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 26, 
27, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39). But it fails to meet the re-
quirement of the statute that it be in writing. 
B. THE NEW CONTRACT CONFERRED ENFORCE-
ABLE RIGHTS UPON PLAINTIFFS, NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Does such new agreement, consisting of the original 
written agreement together with the verbal modifioo.-· 
tions thereof, confer ·any legal rights upon plaintiffs, 
notwithstanding the s·tatute of frauds~ 
Art 12 Am. Jur. 1006, §428, it is stated: 
"It is true that a simple contract co1npletely 
reduce·d to writing cannot be contradicted, 
changed, or n1odified by parol evidence of what 
was s.aid ~and done by th·e parties to it at the time 
iJt w·as Inade, because the parties agreed to put the 
contract in 'vriting and to n1ake the writing part 
.and eovidenee thereof. The very purpose of the 
writing is to render the agreement more certain 
and to exclude parol eviden.ce of it. N everthe-
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less, by the rules of the eommon law, it is com-
petent for the partie1s to a simple contract in 
writing, befor~e any breach of its provisions, al-
together to waive, dissolve, or abandon it, or to 
add to, change, or modify it, OT Viary or qualify 
its terms, and thus make it a new one. In the 
latter case the contract must be proved partly by 
the written and partly by the subsequent oral con-
tract which has thus been incorporated into, and 
made part of, the original one. The reason f:or 
this seems to be that simple contracts, whethe-r 
\vritten or otherwis·e, are, in the absence of a 
statute changing the rule, of the same dignity in 
.contemplation of lavv, and therefore the written 
contract may be changed, modified or waived in 
\Vhole or in p~art by a subsequent one, ~express or 
. 1" d " 1mp 1e ... 
1. ALL PROVISIONS WITHIN THE STATUTE WERE 
FULLY EXECUTED. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is generally true 
that a contract required by the statute of frauds to be 
in \Vriting cannot he modified by :parol. But there is 
a well recognized exception to this where the oral modi-
fication has been acted upon. At 49 Am. Jur. 61)', ~306, 
it is stated: 
''Accordingly, in many cases where the agree-
ment as m·odified has been acted upon, the rights 
of the parties have been held to be determined by 
the modified .agreement. This is especially true 
if -tjhere has been what amounts to a part per-
~ormance, or if both parties have governed them-
selves by the modified agreement. These courts, 
while recognizing the gene~ral principle that an 
agreement requi~red by· the statute of frauds to 
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be in writing may not be substantially altered by 
an Ol}al·agreement, take the position that parties 
may not accept the benefits from such alteration 
and then claim that the transaction is void. 
''It is said that it cannot be objected that the 
modification of a written lease within the statute 
of frauds W•as by pa:rol, after the modified con-
tract has heen executed. Under this rule, a party 
may defend an action brought against him for 
breach of the written agreement by ·showing per· 
f.ormance in accordance with the terms of the oral 
modification; or the party who has performed 
according to the aral agr.eement may recover ac. 
cording to the terms of the oral agreement, or 
main.tain an action in damages for non-perform-
ance on the part of the other party, . . .'' 
"As to what brings a case within the opera-
tion of the rule th.at an oral modification acted 
upon is valid, or at least gives rise to enforceable 
obligations, depends largely upon the facts of 
the individu.al case. It may be stated generally 
that the acts reli-ed upon by the party seeking re-
lief •on the or.al modification must have been taken 
by virtue of the oral contract, and under and in 
pursuance of it . . . '' 
T·he Utah statute of frauds, ordinarily applicable, 
is U.C.A., 1953, 25-5-4: 
''In the follo\ving cases every agreement shall 
be void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandun1 thereof, is in ,,~riting subscribed by 
illie party to be charged therewi tl1 : 
" 
'' ( 5) EYery agreement authorizing or em-
ploying an agent or broker to purchase or sell 
real estnte f~or ·COinpens.ation. '' 
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This statute was construed in K,err vs. Hillyard, 51 
Utah 364, 170 P. 981, in \Yhich defendant real estate 
broke1r ,,~as employed by :plaintiff ·as plaintiff's agent 
to purchase a farm and certain personal pToperty from 
one Bowm~an. The parties agreed orally that defendant 
\Yas to receive as compensation for his services one-half 
of the personal property, not exceeding $300 in value. 
Defendant pr.oceeded to negotiate with Bowman and 
su0ceeded in making 1Jhe purchase, obtaining the1reby, 
in addition to the farn1, personal property of the· value 
of $850. D·ef:endant failed to remit the excess over $300 
to plaintiff, in accordance with the verbal agreement, 
and claimed that such agreement was void, because oral, 
under Comp. Laws 1907, §2467, subdiv. 5, as amended by 
chapter 72, La\vs Utah 1909, eommonly known as the 
statute of frauds, which statute is identical with U.C.A., 
1953, 25-5-4, supra. This eourt held, ~at 170 P. 982: 
''In our opinion the statute relied on has no 
application here. It is true that the de£endant was 
employed by the plaintiff as his agent to purchase 
the farm and personal property :from Mr. Bow-
Inan, and that the employment falls squarely with-
in the letter of the statute. The trans,action re-
lating to the purchase of the farm and of the 
personal property was, however, fully executed, 
and the plaintiff is not suing the defendant to 
enf'orce a ·contract relating to the purch,ase or 
sale of re'al es1tate. What the pl1aintiff is seeking 
by this action is to eompel the defiendant to 
comply with his agreernent which agreement was 
not prohibited by statute. That part of the agree-
ment relating to the personal property was not 
prohibited by the statut~e, and the only re~ason 
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p1aintiff woul'd not be p·ermitted to enforce the 
:same in :an action at law· in case tJhe transaction 
Telating to the real est;te had remained execu-
tory-that is had not been fully executed-would 
be because it was an inseparable part of the 
original employment to purchase the farm from 
Mr. Bowman. When the agreement relating to the 
purchase of the farm had become fully executed, 
however, illien there was no longer any legal 
obstacle in the Wlay which would prevent the plain-
tiff from eompelling the defendant to account 
for the per,sonal property he liad received from 
Mr. Bowman in excess of the $300, which was the 
amount of his compensation, all of which he had 
reeeived and retained . . . '' 
The opinion cites the following authorities, all pro-
ceeding upon the theory that the statute of frauds has 
n·o application to fully executed contracts, and that mat-
teTs arising out of executed contracts may be enforced: 
Eastham vs. Anderson, 119 Mass. 526; Remington vs. 
Palmer, 62 N.Y. 31; Worden ·vs. Sharp, 56 ill. 104; Root 
vs. Burt, 118 Mass. 521; Reytnan vs. Mosher, 71 Ind.596: 
Winters vs. Cherry, 78 M-o. 344; Jl erri1nan vs. Tkomp-
son, 48 Wash. 500, 93 Pac. 1075, Orr vs. Perky Invt. Co., 
65 Wash. 281, 118 Pac. 19, and Stewart vs. Preston, 77 
Wash. 559, 137 Pac. 993. 
The expre'Ssion '• fully executed'' perhaps needs 
som·e attention. Obviously, the court in Kerr vs. Hill-
yard did not 1nean H1-a.t the oral agreement between 
pl1aintiff and defendant had been fully executed by de-
fendant. If it had, there 'vould have be·en no lawsuit. 
F,oT, althougfu· plaintiff did all th1at "~as requiretl of him 
10 
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under the ag-reernent, by executing the tr~ans~action with 
Bo\v1nan, defendant had failed to perform his agree-
ment that plaintiff should receive the personal property 
in ex.cess of $300 in ¥alue. 
In the case no\v before this cou~t, plaintiffs have 
perform~ed all that 'vas required of them under the oral 
agreen1ent, by executing the transaction \vith Granger's, 
as a result of which defendants received their ag-re.ed 
co1npens~ation. But de£endants have fail,ed t1o perform 
their promise that they would, in return, make available 
for plaintif£s certain sums of cash. 
The court in Kerr v. Hillyard was invoking the 
principle declared in Williston on Contracts (Revised 
Edition), vol. II, pp. 1539-40, at §532: 
''lt may also be supposed that every part 
of the contract which is obnoxious to th~e Statute 
has been performed. Under these circumstanc~es 
even though a contract is not properly termed di-
visible, the promise for the remaining perfornt-
ance may be enforced. (Citing many authioritie1s.) '' 
This general proposition is s·et forth in the Restate-
ment -of Contracts, as. follows: 
§219. ''If all pr.omises in a eon'tract \Vhich 
are within tJhe Statute ~are fully performed the 
performance has .the same legal operation as if 
the Statute had be·en satisfied.'' 
§221. ''Where a contract ·consists of one or 
more promises unenforceable because of the 
Statute, and one 'Or more promises which a:ve not 
within it, the latter are unenforceable so long as 
11 
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the former remain unperformed or unenforceable 
but no longer; ... '' 
''·Comment: 
''a. The S·ection relates to .eon tracts which 
contain promises that in thems~elves were from 
the 'Outset n'Ot within the terms of the Statute 
' but ·had coupled with them a.s part of the same 
contract other terms which were within the Stat-
ute. As a .contract is an entirety, it is generally 
true that none of its provisions ·are enforceable 
while part ~are unenforceable, but since non-com-
pliance wi'th the S'ta tute does not prevent the 
eristence of a contract, it is true not only that 
when all promises within the Statute have been 
performed the objection disappears, but that if 
the party entitled to the benefit of performance 
of such promises is willing to have that portion 
of the contract abandoned, he may do so ... '' 
In ·the instant case, as in Kerr vs. Hillyard, the only 
promise's unperfoT111ed are promises relating to person-
alty (money). The promises relating to realty and t<> 
the agents' compensa!tion, required by the statute to be 
in writing, were completely performed. 
It has been argued by defendants here that the 
decision in J( err ·vs. Hillyard turns upon, and is only 
justifie·d by, fl"~aud on the part of the defendant. But 
a careful ex.anrination of the opinion furnishes no basis 
£or such a ·conclusioil-in fact the ter1n '~fraud" does not 
even app~ear in the hea.dnotes to the case. Rather, the 
court based its ·derision solely upon the fact that pl~ain­
tiff ~had fully execut·ed the Ol'~al agreement. The oon-
t:r~olling l•a"\\r is ·a rule of con.fracfs-not of tor·ts. 
12 
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Corbin on Contracts (1950 ed.) states the rule as 
fr01lows, at v.ol. 2, p. 107, §308 : 
• 'Perjor1nance by the Plaintiff may Make the 
Defendant's Ora.l Promise Enforceable. 
·'There are numerous cas·es in which it has 
been held that if the plaintiff has fully or partly 
performed his part as provided in a new oral 
agreement, varying the performance required by 
a pri~or written contract, ·such pe:rformanee by 
the plaintiff will make the new oral agre'ement 
enf,oreerable agiainst the other party, even though 
he too may have promised something different 
from what the written contract required of him. 
It n1ay, as the courts are inclirred to say, 'take the 
oral contract out of the statute.' In cases where 
this is tru~e, the rights rand duti~es of the p·arti:e:S 
are, ,after the substituted performance by the 
pLaintiff, 1uholly deter1nined by the oral agree-
ment so far a.s that differed from the written one, 
and 'tihe written contract is effectively discha:rged 
pro tanto. [Citing Hogan vs. Swayz'e, 65 Utah 
380, 237 P. 1097 (1925).]" 
And at ;pp. 124-8, §313 : 
" 
"(1) A contraet may consist ~of ,a single 
promise for an exe~cuted considel'lation. Tille 
promise may be within the s:tatute; but it is cer-
tain t'hat the execution of the consider~a tron is 
not, f.or the statute m~e.rely prohibits the enf.olf·ce-
ment of a contract and this is properly ap,pliCiable 
only to executory promises. If the single execu-
tory promise is not itself within the statute, it 
is enforceable; this 'lS true even though the con-
tract was originally bilateral' bu.t has become uni-
lateral through full performance of the one prom-
13· 
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ise that was within the statute by r~e,ason of the 
character of the performance promised. 
'' [W,here executory promise is within the 
~statute]. 
'' ( 2) A contr:act may consist of two p:r~omises 
·by A (or one promise of two sepaiDate perform-
ance's) for ~an executed consideration, one of the 
promises being within the statute while the other 
if rt st01od alone, would not be. Thus, for $100 
paid by B, A JroOmises B to answer :for the de-
fiault of C and also to make an audit of C's ae-
counts. In such a case, B should be able to enf-orce 
the promise of an audit. The consideration for 
the two promises is one undivided sum, and the 
contract is called an (entire' contract. But the 
purpose .of tlhe statute is fully attained if A is 
prortect·ed from having to pay for the default of 
C ; and since A has received the entire co-nsidera-
tion for both promises, it is not unjust to compel 
him to perfor1n one of them or to pay da'Yflages. 
' 'In cases of this sort the courts often call 
the contract a divisible contract; but all that the 
facts justify is a staoo1nent that the defendant 
has promised t·wo perfor1nan,ces that can easily 
be distinguished a1~d separated by the court by 
refer,ence to the agree1nent itself. The contract is 
not divisible in th~ sense that the plaintiff has 
given or promised to give a. separate anti distinct 
equiVralent for each .of the t'vo performances 
promi~s~ed by the defend.ant. '' 
2. THE ORAL MODIFICATION WAS ACTED UPON 
AND IT MAY BE ENFORCED, IN ORDER TO A VOID AN 
INEQUITABLE RESULT. 
T·he rel,ated principle N1at an oral1nodifieation which 
14 
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has been acted upon is valid, notwithstanding the stat-
ute of frauds, is established in Utah in Bamberger Co., 
et al vs. Certified Productions, Inc., et al, 88 Utah 194, 
48 P2d 489, affirmed on rehearing 88 Utah 213, 53 P2d 
1153, ( 1935). S·ee also the ~annotation 'at 118 A.L.R. 1511, 
citing this ease in suppo~t ·of this proposition. 
In that ea'Se plaintiffs and the assignor ·of the co'r-
porate defrendant entered into a written lease for the 
letting of certain premises on Main Street in S~alt lia~e 
City, £or a period of ten years. Subsequently tll'ere were 
supplemental oral agreements to forego rent for a cer-
tain period pending the m·aking of required alteTiations, 
which agreements modified the original leas~e. Thes'e 
ag:veement~s were acted upon ·by the corporate defendant, 
which materially eh~anged its position in relianee upon 
them. Plaintiffs sued for restitution under the 'original 
lease, and when the corporate defendant rai'S'ed the oral 
agreements as ~a defen·se, plaintiffs ·cl~aimed that ~an oral 
modification of a written lease requir·ed by the statute 
of frauds 'io be in writing is invalid. The court, spe·ak-
ing through M'r. Justice Wrolfe, refuted thi'S contention, 
stating 'at 48 P2d 491: 
''. . . As a broad general doctrine, it may be 
announced that a contract required by the st1atute 
of frauds to be in writing cannot be modifie<l by 
a :subsequent oral agreement. At the moment the 
principle is ·thus announced, it is immedi·ately 
subject to many and varied excep:tions. The first 
great division comes between executory and .exe-
cuted modifications . . '' 
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And at 48 P2d 492 : 
"It rs claimed by the corporate de£endJant in 
tills ·cas•e tha:t the modified part of the contract 
was by it performed. Consequently we may pro-
cee'd immediately to ·a consideration as to whether 
'an OJ.'!al modification which ·has- been acted upon. 
is valid. Here 1again, there is a division of author-
ity. The note in A.L.R. cites in the United States, 
Cali:Dornia, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Milssis-
sippi, N ebr·aska, New York, North Oarol.ina, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin, ~as states in which it has been held th!at where 
~an agreement as modified has been acted upon 
the rights ·of the parties are to be determined 
by the modified agreement. As stated by Mr. 
J u~stice Oardozo, then justice of tlhe Court of 
Appeals of New York, in Imperator Realty Co. 
vs. Tull, 228 N.Y. ±47, 127 N.E. 263, 266: 'Some-
times the resulting disability has been character-
ized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver . . . 
We need not go into the question of the accuracy 
.of ~tfu.e description . . . The truth is that we are 
·fiacing a principle more nearly ultimate than 
either waiver or estoppel, one 'vith roots in fue 
yet l1arger prin·ciple that no one shall be permit-
te·d to found any claim upon his own inequity or 
·take advantage of his O\Yn \Yrong . . . The stat-
ute of frauds "'as not intended to offer an asylum 
of es0ap·e fron1 that fundan1ental principle of 
justice.' 
'' '\1t> aeeept tl1is principle. If a pa.rty has 
.changed his position by perfor1ning an oral m~­
fieation so that it 'vould be inequitable t1o pernnt 
the dther party to found a. cl1aim up:on t~he original 
agre•en1eut as unn1odified or defeat tl1e former's 
clain1 by setting up a d~efense that perfor1nance 
16 
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was not according to the written cont~act, after 
he has induced~ or c;ousented 'to the former going 
forward, the modified agreement should be held 
valid. We have held in Kerr vs. Hillyard, 51 Utah, 
364, 170 P. 981, that ·a contract required to be in 
writing wlhen fully executed is not within the 
statute of frauds, although originally oral. Logi-
cally, an oral modification of a contract required 
to be in writing when such modification is fully 
executed is taken out of the st.atute. '' 
In the instant ease plaintiffs made and fully per-
~ormed ·the oTal modification, p.ur.suant to d:e£endants' 
representations and inducementS'. They materially and 
irrevocably changed their position tlhereby, resulting 
in material benefit to defendants, :to whiC'h benefit de-
fendants otherwise w:ould not have been entitled. 
3. DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THE 
STATUTE. 
Such circumstances ·comprise ffi'O'st of the elements 
of equitable estoppel, which would constitute an entirely 
separate and independent ba,sis of opposition to rthe stat-
ute. Remaining 'elements of es'toppel are present in 
this case. 
Es,toppel was di'scussed in Kelly vs. Richards, 95 
Utah 560, 83 P2d 731 (1938): 
"It is essential therefore that the repre-
sentation, whether it arises by words, acts or con-
duct, must have been of a material fact; that it 
must have been willfully intended to le'ad the party 
setting up the estoppel to act upon it or that there 
17 
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must have been reasonable grounds and cause to 
think that because thereof he would change his 
position or do some act or take some course on 
faith in the conduct, and that such action results 
to his detriment if the person sought to be estopp-
ed may now repudiate the words or interpretation 
placed upon such conduct. This does not require 
an actual intent to defraud but only that the cir-
cumstances and conduct were such as would per-
petrate a fraud or ·unfair advantage if the party 
could now deny what he had induced or suffered 
another to believe and act upon. It is an essential 
element of estoppel in pais that the person in-
volving it relied upon the representation or con-
duct of the other party, was influenced in his 
own conduct by it, and would not have acted as 
he did but for the acts of which he now complains. 
If complainant's act appears to be the result of 
his own will or judgment, if it does not appear 
to be the proximate result of the conduct or repre-
sentations of the adverse party, there is no estop-
pel. The conduct 1nust of itself have been suffi-
cient to warrant or induce the course of conduct 
by the party seeking to invoke estoppel and it must 
have been made for the purpose of inducing such 
response and action by the con1plainant. We do 
not mean that these are all the elements, nor that 
in every case all n1ust eo-exist equally but some 
of these elen~e·uts 1nust be present in every es-
toppel.'-' 
As no reply to tht~ answ·er in the instant ca.se was 
ordered by the eourt, sueh bar to assertion of the statute 
has not appeared in the pleadings, but it is available, not-
withstanding, under our present procedure. lT.R.C.P., 
Rules 7(a), 8(c), (d). In any eYent. plaintiffs 1nay obtain 
18 
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the relief to which they are shown to be entitled under the 
proofs received in the action. U.R.C .. P., Rule 54( c) (1). 
Defendant.s here misrepresented a material fact, i.e., 
that Carter knew that they could sell the Granger contract 
for $4,000 and make .available to plaintiffs an $8,600 
F.H.A. loan. (D. 14, 15, 16, 27, 36). It may readily be 
inferred that Carter did not know this. 
It has been argued that plaintiffs had knowledge 
of the real fact, but there is nothing in the record to show 
they were aware that Carter did not have the knowledge 
he professed to have in regard to the finances. Plaintiffs' 
knowledge that the money must come from others is not 
knowledge that the money would not be available. Carter 
told them that he knew it could be done, and they believed 
him. (D. 14, 27, 34). At page 27, lines 5 through 25, of the 
desposition appears the following: 
"Q. Did you suppose, then, that $8,600 that you 
hoped to get on refinancing your new home 
would be based upon F.H.A. app·roval ~ 
A. That is what we were informed it would be, 
yes. 
Q. And you understood that from the beginning? 
A. That is what they told us they could do it for. 
You see, what happened, on April 28th-Mr. 
Carter presented it that night - that with the 
contract money of $4,000 and with the house fi-
nanced for $8,600, people who are brokers them-
selves told us what we would obtain would be 
enough to meet our debt.s. That was the figure 
he had assured us he could do-that was the 
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figure he promised us he would able to do, he 
assured us, because we were worried. 
We asked him a number of times if he was 
sure, and if he wasn't, the way things stand, it 
would be better not to sell the house. 
Be better if we had just given them $500. But 
he promised. As a matter of fact, as I recall, he 
phoned Mr. Wood that night to verify the deal to 
us,- that it would go." 
Defendants intended that this representation be 
acted upon by plaintiffs, inducing them to change their 
position. (D. 14, 27, 36, 37). Xo intent to defraud is re-
quired in order to set up an estoppel. Kelly v. Richards, 
supra. Plaintiffs materially and irrevocably changed 
their position, in reliance. (D. 10, 11, 32, 3'7, 43). They 
h·ave been damaged and defendants have received unfair 
advantage, as a result. (R. 2, 3; D. 11, 37). 
C. DEFENDANTS ASSUMED THE RISK THAT PER-
FORMANCE MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE. 
Does the impossibility of performance b~~ defendants 
discharge the oral agreement! 
The risk that a pron1ised performance may be im-
possible, because of existing or supervening circumstan-
ces, may be assun1ed by the pro1nissor. 
In Williston on Contracts (Revised Student Edition} 
908, §1934, it is stated: 
''A pronl·i.se hnpossible of perform,ance may be 
binditng. 
20 
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"'A man may contract that a future event 
shall come to pass over which he has no, or only 
limited, power.' Sage v. Hampe, 235 U.S. 99, 104, 
35 S. Ct. 94, 59 A. Ed. 147. 'If the occurrence of 
an event which is not within human control is in 
term.s promised, the words are interpreted as a 
promise to be answerable for proximate harm 
unless the event occurs.' Rest., Contracts, §457, 
Comment b. Not only may such a promise be bind-
ing in case of supervening impossibility but it 
also may be binding though performance was im-
possible when the promise was made. Indeed, such 
promises are common .... " 
The risk of impossibility was assumed by defendants 
here; as is stated .at page 27 of the deposition, quoted 
supra, and at page.s 15 and 16 of the deposition, as 
follows: 
"Q. Now, knowing that he was not in the finance 
business, did you suppose that Mr. ~c·arter 
could guarantee that he would be .able to sell 
the equity that you had in the contract for any 
specific sum~ 
A. He assured us he could. He said there was 
no worry. 
Q. I didn't ask you quite that question. I asked 
you if you believed, knowing that he was not 
in the finance business, but that he was a 
house salesman, did you believe at that time 
that he could guarantee to sell the equity that 
you had in a contract for any particular sum? 
A. Yes, we took his word for it. 
21 
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Q. Now, Mr. Welchman, as a man familiar with 
the building trade let me state my question 
carefully again to you-This is a court pro-
ceeding, under oath. 
Did you believe at that time that this de-
fendant real estate salesman could guarantee 
to you to sell the equity that you had in a 
contract for any particular or specified sum f 
A. Yes, it being the fact that at the time I knew 
nothing about the contracts, I took his word 
for it, yes. 
Q. You believed, then, that this real estate sales-
man could guarantee to you a certain sum? 
A. He did guarantee to me a certain su.m. 
Q. And you believed he could get that exact sum 
for the contract~ 
A. A few hundred either way, I wouldn't have 
cared. 
Q. You did not then believe that he could get a 
certain sum-I mean, the exact sum yon have 
testified, $4,000, - did you believe he could 
get that sum~ 
A. That is the figure he said to me.'~ 
As Carter did not 1nanifest his intention ambigu-
ously, plaintiff Arnell \Y. elch1nan's belief that he might 
get "a few hundred either "yayH is inuuaterial. Restate-
ment of C·ontracts, §233. 
If, notwithstanding the foregoing, the oral agree-
lnent is held to be void or unenforceable, are defendants 
entitled to retain the con1mission paid b)~ plaintiffs' 
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The Restatement of Contracts provides : 
"§468. Rights of Restitution: 
"(2) Except where a contract clearly pro-
vides otherwise, a p.arty thereto who has rendered 
performance for which the other party is excused 
by impossibility from rendering the agreed ex-
change, can get judgment for the value of what 
he has rendered, less the value of what he has 
received, unless what he has rendered can be and 
is returned to him in specie within a reasonable 
time." 
"Comment on Subsection (2) : 
"b. This Subsection states the rule where the 
plaintiff's performance is not excused by impossi-
bility. The plaintiff may have performed only in 
part or he may have fully performed. In either 
case the defendant's duty to render return p,er-
formance has been excused by impossibility or 
by the frustration of the object of the contract. 
The rule governing the discharge of one p.arty to 
a bilateral contract where the other party fails 
to perform, whether that failure is due to im-
possibility or to misconduct is stated in §27 4 .... 
§274. Failure of Consideration as a Dis-
charge of Duty 
"(1) In promises for an agreed exchange, 
any material failure of performance by one party 
not justified by the conduct of the other discharges 
the latter's duty to give the agreed exchange even 
though his promise is not in terms conditional. 
An immaterial failure does not operate as such a 
discharge. 
"(2) The rule of Subsection (1) is applicable 
though the failure of performance is not a viola-
tion of legal duty. · 
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"Comment: 
"a. The reason for the rules in this and the 
following sections of this Topic is failure of con-
sideration. Failure of consideration is a generic 
expression covering every ca.se where an exchange 
of values is to be made and the exchange does not 
take place, either because of the fault of a party 
or without his fault. In any such case a party 
who has not himself caused the failure of consider-
ation by a breach of duty, may refrain from giving 
any part of the exchange, which he has not yet 
given, and generally may reclaim what he has 
given, or its value. 
"b. Consideration, as used in the phrase, 
failure of consideration, means merely an ex-
change in fact agreed upon. Failure of considera-
tion, therefore, is failure to receive such an ex-
change. In the formation of contracts, considera-
tion is the exchange for a promise ( §75). In the 
present connection the consideration in question is 
the promised performance of one party agreed 
to be exchanged for that of the other. 
"Comment on Subsection (2) : 
"c. The law excuses a contracting party 
from perfonning his pronrise for a variety of 
reasons - infancy, insanity, in1possibility caused 
in certain ways; but hozce,ver blarneless in law 
and fact a party to a contract may be in failing 
to perfor1n his pro1uise, £f he does fail he should 
not have u·hnt i.s pron1i,sed tn ea:clu1nge for his 
perfornzance." 
~.eo the san1e ~ffpet see ,V.illiston on Contracts~ supra, 
§1969 and following. 
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It is not enough that plaintiffs here received so1ne 
legal consideration in return for their promises and acts, 
if they did not receive the consideration bargained for 
and promised, without the pron1ise of which they would 
have made no contract at all, either with defendants or 
with Granger's. (D. 37). 
There is ample support in the record to establish 
a case that-will-survive a motion for summary judgment. 
-4. new contract was entered into by the parties on 
April 28, 1956, which modified and, to the extent of such 
modification, replaced the original written contract of 
March 8, 1956. 
Such new' agreement conferred enforceable contrac-
tual rights upon plaintiffs, notwithstanding the statute 
of frauds, for several, independent, reasons, to-wit: 
( 1) All provisions within the statute were fully 
executed. 
(2) Plaintiffs made and fully performed the oral 
modification, pursuant to defendants' representations .and 
inducements, materially and irrevocably changing their 
position thereby, and thereby conferring upon defend-
ants benefits to which they otherwise would not have 
been entitled. 
( 3) Defendants are estopped to assert the statute. 
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The risk of impossibility of peTformance by defend-
ants was expressly assumed by them. The agreement was 
not discharged thereby. 
In fact and law, plaintiffs are entitled to damage.s for 
breach of contract. 
But, in any event, they are, at the least, entitled 
to restitution of the commission they paid to defendants. 
We respectfully submit that the summary judgment 
should be vacated. 
VICTOR A. SPENCER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
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